no medical care at all. It was estimated that if medical care was organized economically, all the usual needed care for the entire country could be provided for $20 to $40 per person per year (excluding capital costs). Th e most quoted statement from the report indicated the basic problem in medical care was "not the system, but the lack of a system" to organize care.
Th e most common physician practice then was the solo private general practitioner. Th e CCMC also documented other styles of practice, such as industrial medicine, group practice with or without hospital employment, capitated models, public health system practice, and university-sponsored student health care. Th ese nontraditional types of practice needed to grow. Th e fi nal report supported expansion of group practice and formation of the "community medical center" as the most eff ective means of providing care. More national spending on overall medical care was required to meet all the needs, especially to provide for those who had no medical care. Preventive care was thought best provided through public health facilities. Th e most controversial recommendation of the CCMC was for national health insurance, either voluntary or compulsory through taxation. Notable was the fact that eight physicians dissented and wrote a minority report. Th ey supported continued experimentation with such models and new proposals but strongly felt that the independent practicing physician should be in charge of any programs or changes. Th ey objected to competition based on price as "unprofessional." Th is group felt that even voluntary health insurance would lead to a compulsory national health insurance, as was in place in many European countries. Georgia's Dr. Roberts supported the work of the committee and signed the fi nal report.
Two of the nonphysician committee members felt that the report did not go far enough or make strong enough recommendations for national health insurance. Th ey stated that the purpose of the committee had not been fulfi lled. Edgar Sydenstricker and Walton Hamilton were these two.
Little time passed before the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, Dr. Morris Fishbein, penned a blistering denouncement of the work of the CCMC on December 3, 1932, stating it was "incitement to revolution," "socialist," and "communist." Th e American Medical Association (AMA), in its 1933 House of Delegates, took a position of opposition to any further government involvement with medical care. Franklin Roosevelt had been elected president in the depth of the Depression, and the winter of 1933 was the nadir of despair. Any changes in the health care system took a back seat to more pressing matters. Th e famous "First Hundred Days" dealt with banking reforms, help with mortgage foreclosures, and many regulations for businesses in an eff ort to stabilize a critically damaged economy and put people to work, even if it was "make-work." Th e Civilian Conservation Corps, Works Progress Administration, and Public Works Administration were funded with unheralded defi cit spending. In many respects, the report of the CCMC was a tiny blip on any graphic of the crisis.
Within 2 years, Roosevelt appointed an Economic Security Committee in June 1934, which included several of his cabinet members, and called an Economic Security Conference in Washington in November 1934 under the leadership of Frances Perkins, secretary of labor, and Harry Hopkins, director of federal relief programs. Roosevelt asked for unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and proposals on medical care insurance. He spoke in November and advocated medical eff orts "whether soon or at some point later," indicating ambivalence about the health care proposals. A technical staff had been drafting proposals on all these areas since Roosevelt's fi rst speech in July 1934 on the subject, including national health insurance models. During the November conference, an invited Medical Advisory Committee attended and expressed their reservations about the program.
Th is group then met separately in January 1935, ostensibly to give their approval. Th e meeting was chaired by Edgar Sydenstricker, one of the main dissenters of the CCMC. Dr. Walter Bierring, president of the AMA, was among the panel members. Th e prior work of the CCMC was discussed and provided the statistical basis for many recommendations. Th e charge of the advisory group was to respond to the proposed changes for potential legislation. Th e minutes of these meetings, available online through the Social Security historical archives, provide interesting insight into medical issues of the time. Th e advisory committee allowed the recommendation for national health insurance to survive, but there was much internal opposition. Harvey Cushing, the prominent Boston neurosurgeon, was on the advisory committee and spoke outside the committee in opposition. Other physicians on the committee were opposed. Dr. Stewart Roberts appears to have been in support and stated that the medical community was "on trial" and would "regret its actions" if it did not move forward to include medical care with other aspects of Social Security legislation. He apparently felt that the committee members and their work was maligned by the position of the AMA.
With leaks from the committee and the impression that health insurance was coming soon, the AMA called an emergency House of Delegates meeting in February 1935 and vehemently opposed any eff orts at national health care insurance or government regulation of medicine. Th e AMA assumed from the committee structure and technical work that a health care proposal was sure to follow. Th is strong stance by the House of Delegates generated many telegrams from local physicians and state and county medical societies to the White House. It can be safely assumed that the physicians of the day were mostly held in high regard locally and nationally. What impact did this vocal opposition really have on the fi nal decisions? Harry Hopkins continued to favor inclusion of medical assistance, but Frances Perkins advised against it, fearing that the whole Social Security bill would go down. Roosevelt showed caution and held his cards. Whether the medical opposition led to its exclusion or whether Roosevelt was reluctant from the beginning to include national health care in his bold social initiative is the subject of much debate among historians. Roosevelt was known for skillfully making each side feel he agreed with them. Th e fi nal report of the Medical Advisory Committee did not materialize in 1935 and was not published until many years later. Th e Senate fi nance committee gave the Economic Security Bill a beating but ultimately let it through by a small margin, with Senator Th omas Pryor Gore of Oklahoma famously explaining his view that "the dole ruins the soul." Although some public health funding was given, comprehensive national health programs were excluded from the fi nal bill approved by Congress in June 1935.
Many of the proposals advocated in the 1930s still retain their fi re as public debate and divided opinions on the Aff ordable Care Act of 2010 loom large. JAMA 1932; 99(23):1950 -1952 , 1954 -1958 
